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DECISION SUPPORT FOR AIRPORT SURFACE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 
 
Charles E. Billings, Philip J. Smith, Amy Spencer 
The Ohio State University 
Columbus, Ohio 
 
Continual increases in air traffic have threatened to produce gridlock in parts of the national aviation system (NAS). 
Efforts to improve NAS efficiency and throughput by incorporating decision support tools (DSTs) and other 
automation have been difficult because of NAS complexity and unpredictability.  We describe some of the more 




Find ways to safely increase departure and arrival 
throughput at an airport, to reduce taxi times and to 
accommodate customer priorities and constraints.  
Design an airport departure management system  
that is resilient in the face of uncertainty about 
pushback times, taxi times, takeoff times and  




Prior to airline deregulation and for a few years 
afterward, commercial air traffic in the U.S. National 
Airspace System (NAS) was relatively stable and the 
system itself operated reasonably well under the 
direction of highly experienced air traffic controllers 
and managers, even though the NAS was never 
funded well.  All of this began to change as traffic 
increased in the face of lower prices.  More aircraft 
were needed to accommodate ever-increasing 
numbers of passengers.  Prior to September 11, 2001, 
traffic in the busiest terminal areas had become very 
heavy; arrival and to a lesser extent departure delays 
were rising toward intolerable levels, and the public 
and the U. S. Congress began to complain loudly 
about the inadequacy of the system.  Older methods 
of air traffic and traffic flow management (TFM), the 
function which balances air traffic demand against 
available airspace capacity, were heavily taxed in the 
face of personnel shortages.  The situation reached 
crisis levels during the summer of 2000, when traffic 
at the heaviest terminals became grossly overloaded 
and some of the most overloaded terminal areas, none 
designed for these traffic levels, approached gridlock.   
 
A variety of flow control actions, such as weather 
avoidance routes, miles-in-trail flow restrictions, and 
ground delay programs were taken to ameliorate the 
en-route delays, but were only partially successful in  
handling the situations that arose.  A major problem 
was, and is, the lack of predictability in both the en -
route and terminal area systems.  Since TFM 
decisions were typically made 30 minutes to several 
hours in advance of anticipated congestion, ATC and 
System Command Center traffic predictions were 
subject to significant uncertainty.  The magnitude of 
the uncertainty was not known, presented or fully 
understood.  As a result, TFM decisions were often 
overly conservative, and were often taken at 
inappropriate times based on the actual accuracy of 
prediction data” (1).  
 
Maintaining a steady flow of traffic into the NAS 
from airports also requires predictions, on a shorter 
timeline, in order to make efficient use of airport and 
terminal area resources.  “If a ramp administrator or  
controller pushes back several aircraft scheduled off 
the same runway and through the same departure 
gate, these aircraft are likely to end up adjacent in the 
departure queue.  This could result in decreased 
runway throughput due to Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
departure spacing requirements”, which depend on 
aircraft type and weight (2). 
 
Terminal area and surface operations also present 
operators and managers with uncertainties. 
Uncertainty about, among other things: 
 
Both expected and unforeseen problems in preparing 
aircraft at gate (loading, fueling, late passengers, late 
crew transfer, mechanical problems, etc.) 
 
Unavoidable problems during pushback (interfering 
aircraft or surface traffic, tug not available, flight 
documents late in arriving, etc.) 
 
Unexpected problems during taxi-out (airport layout 
idiosyncrasies, need for deicing, congestion  of 
taxiways, long runway queues, airspace congestion, 
blocked departure fixes, etc). 
 
Unwanted problems at departure queues: (insufficient 
space to re-order departing aircraft,  sequencing, 
ordering by weight classes, departure fixes, en-route 
issues, etc.) 
 
Other problems before or at takeoff: (surface 




The need to accommodate airline and other 




What is the net impact of this large number and 
variety of variables on our surface operations?   
What is the core problem, and how might we cope 
with it in real time? 
 
The Cost of Surface Traffic Delays in Air Transport 
(3)  In 2004, Departure/arrival delays of >15 minutes 
at 11 major European airports exceeded 15%. 
 
Subsequent work by Eurocontrol showed that departure 
delays from London Heathrow Airport (LHR) were 
higher than at any other airport in Europe. 
 
In summer 2004, British Airways’ (BA) airborne 
holding just at LHR totaled 298,904 minutes.  This is 
the equivalent of having three aircraft unavailable for 
the season. 
 
BA’s Air Traffic Flow Management arrival delays 
attributable to LHR amounted to 126,254 minutes, 
the equivalent of one permanently grounded aircraft. 
 
On departure, aircraft ground movements delays at 
LHR amounted to 226,894 minutes (the equivalent of 
another “grounded” aircraft), mainly due to airfield 
congestion and layout problems. 
 
Assuming approximately 100 passengers per LHR 
flight, total passenger delay minutes from airborne 
holding alone during summer 2004 amounted to 
2,295 passenger delay hours per day—or 287 
passengers holding for eight hours every day. 
 
The Complexities of Surface Management Aids 
 
Many investigators have attempted to get a handle on 
this very complex and challenging problem.  Idris (4) 
modeled the movement of aircraft on the airport 
surface as a controlled queueing system and observed 
that aircraft queues are manifestations of flow 
constraints.  “While runways, taxiways, ramps, gates, 
and air traffic control all contribute to departure delays, 
the largest queues and delays occur at the runways.  
Runway flow constraints are the result of the required 
minimum separation between departures, as well as 
downstream restrictions that propagate back to require 
additional inter-departure separation at the runway.”   
 
Atkins (5) noted that “These delays between 
consecutive departures may indicate an opportunity for 
automation to increase throughput.”  He proposed a 
new method for reconstructing the departure queues 
from available data. (This notion has motivated a good 
deal of research into Departure Management Systems.) 
 
Pujet and colleagues (6) also observed that “in less than 
ideal weather, arrival and departure can be dramatically 
reduced … The reduced departure capacity can result in 
very long taxi-out times at peak hours, as the departing 
aircraft wait in a queue before being allowed to take 
off.”  They proposed and validated an input-output 
model of the current departure process … and used this 
model to estimate the feasibility and benefits of 
departure control mechanisms which aim at reducing 
departure queues in low visibility conditions.  They 
observed that “in initial computer simulation tests, the 
heuristic departure slot allocation algorithm (they) 
described did not perform as well as the simple state-
feedback gate holding control scheme” … in which 
aircraft are held at their gates whenever N becomes 
larger than a saturation value Nsat  which typically 
corresponds to periods when the runway queue is not 
empty and thus when the runway is operating at 




A number of authors have focused on pushback as a 
timed event at which delays can be minimized, 
reasoning that if departing aircraft can arrive at their 
departure queue at the exact time they are needed, 
queues, and thus delays, will be minimized.  It should 
be noted that in the United States, push-back times 
have not been specified by Air Traffic Control, which 
takes over management of aircraft only at a specific 
location or “spot”, where control is turned over to 
ATC by the operating air carrier.  ATC has generally 
operated under a “first-come, first-served” heuristic 
which does not take account of aircraft weight, 
departure fix, or any of a number of other variables 
that can become important in expediting the 
departure process. 
 
Carr (7) examined “best-case” errors in push-back 
forecasts under minimum uncertainty conditions 
(which had not been done previously) and tested 
several quantitative models for computing push-back 
forecasts against 3820 of 17,344 real-world ground 
operations over three months of Lufthansa flights 
through Frankfurt.  The dataset contained detailed 
timing of all turn processes.   He discussed important 
variables in the turn process in some detail (ch.  2).   
 
Carr concluded that “Uncertainty in the airline turn 
process imposes limitations on pushback predictability, 
which in turn limits DST performance … The best-case 
standard deviation of forecast error for all of the forecast 
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techniques was observed to be lower-bounded at 
roughly half (+/-5 min) of the average-case standard 
deviation derived in previous studies.  Furthermore, this 
forecast error did not decrease until only a few minutes 
prior to pushback. … Due to these difficulties with 
delayed turns over a short horizon, it is necessary to 
build DSTs which do not rely on predicted pushback 
times for such turns.” (p. 53) 
 
It was observed that “current pushback forecast errors 
(on the order of +/-15 min.) cannot be reduced by a 
factor of more than 2 or 3.  Furthermore, for each 
ground event, only 3 observations are necessary to 
achieve best-case performance: available time 
between actual on-blocks and scheduled off-blocks; 
the time until deboarding begins; and the time until 
boarding ends.   
 
He observed further that “Any DST used in real-
world operations must be robust to this ‘noise floor’”.   
“To support the development of robust DSTs, a 
unified framework called ceno-scale modelling is 
developed.  This class of models encodes a wide 
range of observed delay mechanisms using multi-
resource synchronization (MRS) feedback networks. 
A ceno-scale model instance is created for Newark 
International Airport, and the parameter sensitivity 
and model fidelity are tested against a detailed real-
world dataset.” (from author’s abstract).  
 
It is interesting to note that during his research at 
Newark, Carr observed “a fundamental control 
strategy” in place at Continental Airlines, a major user 
of that airport.  This company, to assist ATC and 
minimize delays, “responded to severe downstream 
restrictions by pre-sequencing departing aircraft on the 
airport surface.  This pre-sequencing strategy was 
conceptually simple: departing aircraft which needed 
to use the same downstream navigational departure fix 
were grouped together into separate queues.  This 
allowed ATC to easily select aircraft to meet the 
availability of each fix.  In contrast, the other airlines 
at EWR did not have the necessary space or 
infrastructure to pre-sequence or aggregate their 
departures.  In that case, the departure at the head of a 
FIFO (first in, first out) buffer was often delayed 
waiting for its fix to become available, while several 
following aircraft in the same buffer which could have 
departed were unnecessarily delayed.” (Carr, p. 91). 
 
Strategies to Minimize Departure Delays 
 
Anagnostakis and Clarke at the MIT ICAT (8) (2002) 
analyzed surface movements at several major airports 
and searched for strategies to mitigate departure 
delays.  They introduced a “two-stage” optimization 
algorithm for solving the runway operations planning 
(ROP) problem to determine the optimal departure 
schedule.  “The goal of runway operations planning is 
to generate a schedule of operations (arrivals, 
departures and crossings) that are as close to optimality 
as possible while taking into account uncertainties in 
pushback and taxi operations.  Successful 
implementation of these optimal schedules will 
minimize departure inefficiencies related to such 
factors as wake vortices, downstream constraints, … 
workload limitations, and intersecting runways” (p. 2).  
They described and illustrated the two stages of their 
model using data from Boston’s Logan Airport.  The 
hypothesis motivating this study was that ROPs could 
be generated and used as a guide to create pushback 
plans (sequence and timing) in a way that enhances 
airport throughput and delay performance, even 
without managing aircraft taxi operations (from gates 
to runways) at a very detailed level (e.g., assigning 
intersection priorities) and without implementing 
sophisticated surface operations planning schemes 
(advanced taxi route planning). 
 
This paper (9) is an excellent early (2000) discussion 
of a conceptual departure planning system.  It outlines 
and illustrates the interaction between air carriers and 
ATC necessary to permit either manual or automated 
surface control of departing aircraft, and also the 
information required for mixing arrival and departure 
flows when this is necessary (p. 13-14).                         
 
As Anagnostakis et al. stated (in 9, abstract), “arrivals 
and departures are highly coupled processes, especially 
in terminal airspace, with complex interactions and 
sharing of the same airport resources between arrivals 
and departures in practically every important terminal 
area.”  Most of the alternative strategies for increasing 
departure throughput, as illustrated above, have 
focused on managing the pushback process, although 
this cannot be done efficiently without taking account 
of the gate resources needed for arriving aircraft, and 
the same taxi surface space must accommodate both 
departing and arriving aircraft for a period if their 
times overlap.   
 
As shown by Carr, long-term prediction of ready-to-
push time has been extremely difficult as well as 
imprecise.  This has been a consistent message in 
many of these studies.  What may be viable 
alternatives, given that some means of monitoring, 
directing and tracking departing aircraft is essential to 
minimize departure queues? 
 
In 2000, Anagnostikos proposed (9) a “virtual queue 
manager” which “may be used to convert taxi delays 
to gate delays, which are less costly both for airlines 
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and the environment” (p. 7, fig. 7). He also mentioned 
that the availability of CDM information has improved 
[the timeliness of] advanced cancellation notices 
appreciably.  CDM is discussed below. 
 
Resequencing of Departures before Takeoff 
 
Jason Atkin and coworkers at the Faraday Centre  
and University of Nottingham did detailed studies of 
London Heathrow Airport.  They noted that the 
unique shapes and locations of the departure holding 
areas at LHR required considerable planning by 
controllers to resequence departures.  From Abstract: 
“At many airports the runway throughput is the 
bottleneck to the departure process and as such it is 
vital to schedule departures effectively and 
efficiently.  For reasons of safety, separations need to 
be enforced between departing aircraft. … Departures 
from London Heathrow are subject to physical 
constraints that are not usually modeled in departure 
runway scheduling models. … We will show how 
these constraints have already been included in the 
model we present or can be included in future. … We 
propose a metaheuristic-based solution for 
determining good sequences of aircraft in order to aid 
the runway controller in this difficult and demanding 
task. Finally, some results are given to show the 
effectiveness of this system …” (10)  Given the 
findings by many investigators that the most serious 
delays are at the runway waiting for takeoff, this 
approach, while airport-specific, would appear to be 
worth studying to ascertain its potential applicability 
to other airports where limited sequencing space  
is a problem.   
 
The European Air Traffic Management organization, 
EUROCONTROL, has for over a decade been 
studying and developing ways to improve air traffic 
management.  Though European ATC has been 
strictly aligned according to a “management by 
direction” paradigm (14), a number of papers from 
that area suggest rather strongly that this attitude is 
gradually changing.  Some of the materials are from 
government and commercial organizations 
participating in developing and fielding advanced air 
traffic management systems; others are from some of 
the airports involved in bringing such management 
systems to fruition in day-to-day operations.  It 
should be said that investigators in the United 
Kingdom, the U.S., the Netherlands and elsewhere 
have also been active in this area.  
 
Integrated Departure Management Systems 
 
The DLR Institute for Flight Guidance, in 
Braunschweig, Germany, working in cooperation 
with the DFS (the German Air Navigation Services 
provider) and various contractors, has worked very 
actively on aircraft management concepts for many 
years.  The Institute has also worked in collaboration 
with the United States, Great Britain and Eurocontrol 
to develop automation that can help controllers with 
their very difficult tasks and to help relieve them of 
the ever-increasing volumes of traffic with which 
they are confronted in their work.  A major figure in 
this work has been Deitmar Böhme, of that Institute.  
The following summary of the present status of the 
DLR work is based on a series of three presentations 
he and co-workers have made during 2003-2005.  
 
Böhme’s first paper (2003), Optimal Runway 
Operations Planning (ROP), (11), discusses the 
overall concept of ROP, the work then in progress, 
the building blocks of the planning algorithms, and 
the initial structure of a major planning module called 
DMAN, the departure planner.  The initial 
operational concept for DMAN was developed by 
The Defence Evaluation and Research Agency in 
England. Eurocontrol had asked for a module that 
could provide planning of take-off operations and 
decisions for optimal runway allocations.  DMAN 
was planned as a stand-alone demonstrator and pre-
operational prototype and was tested by DLR alone 
and in combination with other service modules: A-
SMGCS (an advanced Surface Movement Guidance 
and Control System), in the context of AATM 
(Airport Airside Traffic Management), and other 
tools under development.  It was also scheduled for 
testing at Prague Airport, and at Frankfurt. 
 
Dr. Böhme’s second review paper, prepared with 
Eugène Tuinstra of the NLR, National Aerospace 
Laboratory of the Netherlands, Tactical and Pre-
Tactical Departure Planning (12), was presented in 
2005 at DLR.  The purpose was to increase airport 
efficiency by implementation of decision support 
tools based on planning algorithms, some discussed 
in the earlier presentation.  These DSTs by that time 
included:  
 AMAN, an arrival manager, 
 DMAN, the departure manager, 
 SMAN, a surface manager, and 
 GMAN, a stand and gate manager. 
 
Collaborative Decision Making 
 
A major purpose of these studies was to consider the 
Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) aspects, to 
involve all CDM partners, especially airlines and 
airports; to anticipate the future “airport situation”, 
especially adverse conditions, to perform pre-
departure planning to enhance network efficiency, to 
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schedule operations depending on time, and finally to 
concentrate on departure management as a key 
process of Airport Traffic Management that needs to 
be supported urgently by tools.  The paper discussed 
the optimization process: why, in particular, pre-
tactical and tactical planning required decision 
support, then placed CDM and Departure 
Management in the larger context of ATC runway 
planning.  It introduced a new tool, an Outbound 
Punctuality Sequencer (OPS), and showed certain 
features of its design. It pointed out that OPS 
minimized separation by optimizing the punctuality 
of all flights, thus increasing capacity; that OPS 
improved punctuality by CDM and preference 
functions, leading to enhanced predictability, and that 
the methods regulated queueing and taxi movements, 
leading to reduced controller workload.  The paper 
went on to discuss the architecture of the 
Eurocontrol/DLR DMAN system and showed some 
of the planning constraints.  It then presented some 
first results from real-time simulation trials of 
DMAN.  As an instance, queue length with DMAN 
was decreased from approximately 7 aircraft to about 
2 aircraft in a 70-minute simulation.   
 
The authors concluded that in the Gate-to-Gate 
project, it was proved successfully that a considerable 
increase in efficiency of departure management could 
be achieved with both modules: RTS1: tactical 
DMAN, RTS2: pre-tactical DMAN.  The modular 
TANDEM approach of a combined pre-tactical and 
tactical departure manager combines the desirable 
features of both approaches, i.e.: 
 the CDM capability of a pre-tactical planner 
(extended planning horizon; incorporation of pre-
departure planning of airlines, airport and ATC), as 
well as 
 the tactical support of ATC to establish optimal 
departure schedules in a highly dynamic environment 
with many unforeseen events. 
 
The modular TANDEM approach afforded a 
stepwise implementation of the modules. 
 
The coordination principles allow: 
 A silent hand-over from pre-tactical to tactical 
(without additional communication effort), and 
 Variation of the strength of coupling due to the 
demands of the actual traffic situation. 
 
The authors suggested that a quantitative estimation 
of benefits and evaluation of performance and quality 
measures need further investigations and extended 
real-time simulations. 
 
The third presentation by Dr. Böhme, also in 2005, 
was titled Airport CDM: The Contribution of the 
XMAN Approach (13).  (“XMAN” refers to the entire 
suite of tools comprising the Departure Planning 
Process:  AMAN arrival manager, DMAN departure 
manager, TMAN turn-around manager, each fully 
developed and implemented, and SMAN, the surface 
manager, which is partly developed.)  The author 
offers the following objectives: an increase in 
punctuality (target off-block time), an increase in 
predictability and an increase in efficiency in terms 
of airport resources and network capacity.  The 
partners in this collaborative approach are airport 
operators, aircraft operators, ground handlers, the air 
navigation service provider (ANSP), the Central 
Flow Management Unit (CFMU), a part of ATC, and 
support services, all linked by CDM.  The elements 
of the CDM-A (advanced) program include airport 
CDM information sharing, turn-around process, 
variable taxi time calculation, collaborative 
management of flight updates, a collaborative pre-
departure sequence, and CDM in adverse conditions 
to anticipate delay situations and apply strategies to 
facilitate a quick return to normal operations. 
 
The XMAN approach: automated use of tools to 
assist controllers in planning and tactical decision 
making, is a major tool in these processes.  Böhme 
presents some general principles for planning of 
consecutive operations: backward propagation of 
target times, forward estimation of the first, or 
earliest, times of events and a warning that every 
planned target time must never be smaller than the 
corresponding predicted earliest time. 
 
Finally, Böhme discusses the incorporation of aircraft 
priorities of the airline/airport and suggests how these 
priorities can be incorporated as preferences in the 
planning process. 
 
He concludes that CDM and XMAN are not 
competitive, but mutually supporting concepts.  He 
notes that XMAN planning tools can provide 
quantitative measures of accuracy (predictability, 
reliability) as on-time information.  More reliable 
planning information will support both intra-airport 
CDM and inter-airport CDM through improved 
coordination among the participants in these 
processes.   
 
Coordinated planning tools have the potential to 
provide techniques, with whose help airline/airport 
preferences can be taken into account without 
disadvantageous side-effects such as the need for 
additional communication, the risk of inconsistent 
constraints, the risk of a substantial loss of overall  
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efficiency, or disturbances and complication of the 
management tasks of ATC. 
 
The latest, but perhaps the most essential, project in 
the XMAN approach is called collaborative decision 
making, and its essence is to facilitate the 
transmission, storing and retrieval of data necessary 
to the departure (or arrival) processes.  This very 
complex, dynamic, distributed system is information-
bound.  The output of the system is decisions, and the 
input necessary to arrive at consistently good 
decisions is information—about state, status, 
intentions, problems—all of the information that will 
permit the next person or facility handling a given 
aircraft to do so with full knowledge of those parts of 
the system which may impact that aircraft’s ability to 
continue its progress.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Information and knowledge are the commodities that 
have been most lacking in aviation’s past.  The 
system has in a few years gone from one in which a 
good deal of experience and intuition was necessary 
for effective functioning to one in which our 
communications devices, databases and dynamic 
changes in system state and function can easily 
drown even a capable operator in data and 
information.  Herein lies a major human factors 
opportunity, for we know how to assist our operators 
in the task of assimilating the information if we take  
maximum advantage of the capabilities of CDM and 
provide assistance to those who are designing the 
displays, decision aids, and human-machine 
interfaces that will be needed to take full advantage 
of this opportunity. 
 
Dr. Böhme is not the only investigator in this field to 
have realized the critical need to make all of the 
players active participants in the production process.  
But the concept of a system of systems (XMAN) 
anchored by a sound, real-time medium for 
communication of all necessary information among 
participants, (A-CDM), is relatively new and very 
promising.  Whether this concept will suffice to help 
us understand and solve the difficult problem of 
optimizing departures in this heavily loaded air 
transport system is not really foreseeable yet, but it 
seems clear that without this communications platform 
to link the parts of this complex of tasks, we are most 
unlikely to solve the problems that gave rise to this 







 1. Wanke C, Song L, Zobell S, Greenbaum D, 
Malgund S (2005) Probabilistic Congestion 
Management. 6th USA/Europe Seminar of Air Traffic 
Management, Baltimore, MD. 
 
 2. Spencer A, Smith P, Billings C, Brinton C, 
Atkins S, Walton D (2003) Decision Support and 
Information Exchange to Improve Airport Surface 
Management. Proc. 2003 Avn. Psych. Symposium. 
 
 3. British Airways (2005) A report and 
consultation by the CAA of The Aerodrome 
Congestion Working Group: Response by British 
Airways, April 2005. Unpublished document. 
 
 4. Idris H (2000) Observation and Analysis of 
Departure Operations at Boston Logan Intl. Airport.  
Ph.D. Thesis, Mass. Institute of Technology, 
Cambridge, MA. 
 
 5. Atkins  SC (undated) Estimating Departure 
Queues to Study Runway Efficiency. “Log no. 
G6578”, no other identification. 
 
 6. Pujet N, Delcaire B, Feron E (1999) Input-
Output Modeling and Control of the Departure 
Process of Congested Airports. AIAA paper 99-4299. 
 
 7. Carr FR (2004) Robust Decision-Support 
Tools for Airport Surface Traffic. Cambridge, MA: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
 8. Anagnostakis I, Clarke J-P (2002) Runway 
Operations Planning: A Two-Stage Heuristic 
Algorithm.  AIAA paper 2002-5886. 
 
 9.  Anagnostikis I, Idris HR, Clarke J-P, Feron 
E, Hansman RJ, Odoni AR, Hall WD (2000) A 
Conceptual Design of a Departure Planner Decision 
Aid.  3rd USA/Europe Air Traffic Management R&D 
Seminar, Naples, Italy. 
 
 10. Atkin JAD, Burke EK, Greenwood, JS, 
Reeson DS (2004)  Departure Runway Scheduling at 
London Heathrow Airport: Extended Abstract. No 
publication information. 
 
 11. Böhme D (2003) Optimal Runway 
Operations Planning.  1st Joint MIT-DLR workshop 







 12. Böhme D, Tuinstra E (2005) Tactical and 
Pre-Tactical Departure Planning.  DLR Institute for 
Flight Guidance, Braunschweig, Germany: Airport—
Bottleneck or Booster for Future ATM. 
 
 13. Böhme D (2005) Airport CDM: The 
Contribution of the XMAN Approach.  DLR Institute 
for Flight Guidance, Braunschweig, Germany: 
Airport—Bottleneck or Booster for Future ATM. 
 
      14.   Smith PJ, McCoy E, et al. (1997) Control by 
Permission: A case study of cooperative problem-
solving. Air Traffic Control Quarterly 4:229-247. 
 
44
